Showing posts with label Spurs. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Spurs. Show all posts

Friday, 8 April 2011

Financial Fair Play - crunching the numbers

This is the first in a series of posts looking at the challenges faced by English clubs in complying with UEFA's Financial Fair Play ("FFP") rules. Next season (2011/12) is the first year when clubs' "break-even result" are calculated. The tables below shows what "break-even result" the seven English clubs that played in Europe this season would have achieved on last year's figures (Liverpool numbers are for 2008/09 as they have not yet published 2009/10 results).

Relevant income


The "relevant income" calculation is the simplest bit of the FFP rules. All football club revenue (which I have divided into the common matchday/media/commercial and retail split) is of course included. In addition, the profit from selling players is included too. Profit in this sense means the difference between a player's selling price and the book value of his registration on the club's balance sheet. Players that come through a club's youth system have a zero book value and thus any sale proceeds are 100% "profit" in the FFP calculations.

Income from non-football operations is excluded, except where they are based at or close to a club's ground (such as hotel or conference facilities). Chelsea's hotel would therefore be included in the income calculation, as would Manchester City's "Sportcity" redevelopment around Eastlands. Arsenal's property income from the re-development of Highbury would be excluded.

The other major exclusion, and one no doubt likely to cause controversy, is revenue received from "related parties" (effectively the owner or people/corporations connected to them) in transactions that are carried out "above fair value". This rule (described in Annex X B 1j) says that transactions with a related party must be compared to the "fair value" that would have been achieved if the transaction was done as a normal commercial deal. Any income above this "fair value" is disregarded when calculating a club's income. This rule is designed to prevent owners subsidising their club by, for example, paying £50m per year for a box that would normally cost £250,000.

Relevant expenses




The expenses element of the FFP is more complicated and less intuitive than the income side. Staff costs are included and are by far the largest element, indeed it can be argued that the whole aim of FFP is to bear down on staff costs across European football. Other cash operating expenses are included (the basic costs of running a football club), but depreciation of fixed assets is not included. This means that there is no account taken under the FFP calculation of any costs from investing in stadiums or training grounds. Owners can finance such capital expenditure without limit under FFP.

Finance costs such as interest payments are included, but not if they relate to borrowing taken on to construct "tangible fixed assets" such as stadia, training facilities etc. In the table above, I have deducted the c. £14.5m of Arsenal's £20.8m of interest costs that relate to the club's financing of the Emirates.

The interest figure for United excludes the significant one-off refinancing costs the club recognised in 2009/10. My understanding is that such costs would not be included under FFP. On an ongoing basis, United's bond interest will be around £44.5m per annum.

A vital element of the expenses calculation is the inclusion of the "amortisation of player contracts" charge, which is how the cost of transfers is accounted for.

The accounting treatment of transfer spending is one of the least intuitive elements of finance for most football supporters. In the UK, the treatment is covered by "Financial Reporting Standard 10: Goodwill and Intangible Assets". In a transfer, the asset that is being bought and sold is not of course the player himself but the player's registration. This "asset" has a finite length of course, being the length of the player's contract with the acquiring club and FRS 10 says that the cost of buying the registration must be "recognised" over that life.

So when a club "buys" a player on a five year deal for (say) £20m, the cost is recognised over the 5 years at £4m per year, this is the "amortisation charge" for that player that appears in the profit and loss account. The timing of cash payments is irrelevant. The money could be paid up front or in agreed stages but the "cost" is recognised evenly over the contract. If after (say) three years the player negotiates a new five year deal, the remaining value (£8m in this example) plus any costs of negotiating the new contract (hello Paul Stretford et al) are added together and then recognised over the life of the new contract.

By including the amortisation charge in the expenses calculation, FFP captures transfer spending over an extended period. Even if a club stops spending after a period of heavy investment, the amortisation charge will stay high for a prolonged period. The chart below shows my estimate of Manchester City's charge over the next five years assuming no further purchases or sales (other than those players currently out on loan).


Dividend payments are captured in the calculation (in order to ensure debt is not disguised as equity). If the Glazers exercise any of their dividend rights (currently around £95m), such payments would have to be included in the FFP calculation.

As with the income calculation, transactions with "related parties" not done at "fair value" are adjusted for in the relevant expenses calculation. This is to prevent owners subsidising their clubs through taking on club costs (such as directly paying players for example).

The final major adjustments in the expense calculation relate to spending on youth development and community activities. Both are excluded from the FFP numbers, meaning clubs can spend as much as they wish on these areas. I have estimated figures for all seven clubs as they are not separately disclosed in the accounts.

Income minus expenses = "break-even result"




Subtracting "relevant expenses" from "relevant income" gives us the all important "break-even result". This is the key figure under the new regulations. In the first two "monitoring periods", seasons 2011/12 and 2012/13, clubs are not permitted to make a loss greater than €45m (c. £39.5m) over these two years combined if they are to receive a licence to play in Europe in 2013/14.

As you can see from the table above, only three or the seven English clubs would have made a profit under the break-even calculation last year, and Spurs' profit was only due to profits on player sales. United would have shown a loss if the exceptional financing costs were included. The losses at both Chelsea and City stand out. The figures for Liverpool are misleading, because they include significant finance costs relating to the debt Hicks and Gillet loaded on the club which have now been cleared.

Enforcement and exemptions
Meeting the new rules is going to be hard for many clubs across Europe. A key question is the extent to which  UEFA actually enforce their new rules. The credibility of Michel Platini and UEFA as an organisation are clearly on the line, and I believe they will be enforced, although that may well mean banning a major club from European competition.

The rules do give one notable exemption to the calculations I have outlined for the first two seasons in which the rules apply (2013/14 and 2014/15), set out in Annex XI 2, the final page of the regulations. If a club breaches the "break-even" target in the "monitoring periods" for either of these seasons because of a loss in the 2011/12 season caused by wages paid to players under contracts signed before 1st June 2010 (when the FFP rules were published) the club will be let off (as long as losses are reducing over time). That is quite a big get out, and may well mean that City and Chelsea do not face the imminent prospect of a European ban. The exemption is only temporary however and the principle remains the same, if UEFA enforce FFP, many clubs are going to have to cut their wage bills and/or radically boost their revenues in the next few years.

LUHG


Thursday, 11 November 2010

Spurs results 2009/10: desperately in need of a new stadium


Tottenham Hotspur plc published its summary figures for the year to June 2010 this morning. We'll have to wait a few days until the full report and accounts are published to get all the details (like an accurate number for the wage bill) but the press release covers most of the key points.


Overview
Excluding transfers, Spurs is reasonably profitable at the operating level. The club focuses on "operating profit" (which includes depreciation), but I prefer the more commonly used EBITDA which rose 20% to £25.4m from £21.2m the previous year.

The profit improvement was driven by turnover up 6% whilst operating costs were only up 3%. Almost all the increase in turnover came from higher PL TV receipts. Although the total paid to all 20 clubs only increased 5%, Spurs' share increased 16.4% due to their fourth place finish and higher number of broadcast games. This increase in PL TV income offset falls in gate receipts and corporate hospitality due to the club not qualifying for Europe the year before and therefore only playing 24 home games (vs. 28 in 2008/9). Merchandising and "other" income both rose sharply.

In these figures we do not have details of how the £94.4m of operating costs split between wage and non-wage expenses. In total however, operating costs only rose 2.8%. Assuming non-wage costs were flat (as they were the previous year) we can estimate that wages only rose 4.3%, which is commendable and better than the 7% growth seen at Arsenal and United.

The profit on player sales was down sharply from £56.5m to £15.3m. This reflects the very profitable sales of Berbatov and Keane in 2008/09, compared to those of Darren Bent, Zokora and Boateng in 2009/10. The amortisation charge continues to rise albeit slowly (this is the cost of transfer spending spread over the length of players contracts and is an important component of the new Financial Fair Play regulations). The amortisation charge was £39.5m up 3.6%. Actual net cash spending on transfers was £27.5m, more than the club's EBITDA.

Net interest paid rose to £5.0m on gross debt of around £90m (up from £80m). The club issued £15m of new shares during the year.

So the £25m of EBITDA was insufficient to cover the £5m of interest and the £27.5m of net transfer spending. The gap was small, but existed despite Spurs having the lowest wage bill of any of the clubs with a realistic ambition to achieve a top 4 finish.



Challenges and opportunities

Spurs' wage bill of c. £63m makes it a minnow compared to the "big 4" and City (see table below). Having broken into the Champions League, Spurs' financial and footballing challenge is to maintain a good enough squad to stay there (or at least have a good chance of achieving a top 4 finish each season).

* 2008/09 **Esimated
This season, Spurs will benefit from at least three Champions League home games (and almost certainly at least one knock-out stage game) as well as the TV income from the competition. The club do not publish a total "matchday" number and include corporate hospitality in their "Commercial" turnover but assuming gate receipts account for 75% of total matchday revenue, each home game is worth around £1.5m in additional income. Assuming elimination in the first knockout round of the competition, the club will earn around £6m in matchday income and around €30m (c. £25m) from UEFA TV money. The dual Autonomy/Investec shirt deal is reported to be worth £25m over two years, representing an increase of c. £4m pa on the previous sponsorship by Mansion. Like all Premier League clubs, Tottenham will receive an additional c. £5m from the new overseas PL deals. Assuming a roughly consistent domestic performance, Tottenham should earn c. £40m more than last season.


This Champions League bonanza could clearly help finance a squad with more strength in depth, one able to compete both domestically and in Europe. History shows that relying on continual Champions League football is highly dangerous (see Liverpool or Leeds) and Daniel Levy is too smart to fall into this trap. Whilst this season's CL run is very helpful (even if the wage bill rises this year with the arrival of van der Vaart and Gallas), Tottenham need to close the earnings gap with United, Arsenal and Chelsea who have turnover £84-167m higher. Beyond playing performance related revenue, this means building a bigger stadium.

Last season, White Hart Lane was full to 98% of its theoretical capacity for the club's 24 home games. The waiting list (a proper one which fans have to pay to be on) is 33,000 or 90% of the Lane's current size. The comparison with Arsenal is instructive, with the Emirates bringing in £3.5m per home game vs. Spurs' £1.5m and with Arsenal's blended revenue per seat around £58 vs. Spurs' c. £42 (reflecting fewer and lower quality corporate facilities at WHL). A new stadium could allow Spurs to increase their matchday income by around £40-50m per annum, easily giving them the means to pay the £100m+ wage bill their competitors can afford (or in City's case can't).

The stadium question links to how well prepared the club are for UEFA's Financial Fair Play rules. On my estimates (see table below), Spurs would have squeaked in last season by £2m, but were reliant on their profit on player sales to do so. This season the CL income will easily cover any shortfalls, but the margins are tight in years when they aren't in the European Cup.


So the big question for a prudently run club like Tottenham is can they finance and build their new home? Liverpool fans know how hard it is to do and there is no Highbury-like property bonanza to be had in N17. Debt is already at £90m, albeit much of this has funded property investment around the ground.  Without the additional income that a new ground would bring, it is hard to see Spurs competing consistently with the big boys. The alternative is relying on Redknapp's wheeling and dealing and accepting the role of a feeder club (G. Bale anyone?).

LUHG