Why Barcelona are entering a period of “austerity” and probably can’t afford Rooney....

The shadow of UEFA's Financial Fair Play Regulations ("FFPR") continues to fall over European football. Whilst most commentators see the FFPR as being designed primarily to clip the wings of the sugar daddy financed Manchester City or Chelsea, the last few days has seen their practical impact on a club that should require no external financing; FC Barcelona.

On Saturday, new President Sandro Rosell and CEO Rossich Anthony not only persuaded Barca members to vote for court action against former President Joan Laporta but presented a budget for the current 2010/11 financial year which imposes breathtaking cuts on the formerly spendthrift club.

The Rosell revolution

In some ways, the plans for 2010/11 contain the usual Barca swagger. Matchday and media income is projected to increase slightly implying progression to semi-finals of the Champions League for what be the fourth year in a row. What has gone however is the enormous spending of the Laporta era. Sporting salaries (84% of which relate to football according to the most recent accounts) are projected to fall 6.2% having risen 17% last season. Player amortisation (the cost of transfer spending recognised over the contract life of acquire players) is projected to fall 17% and other costs are supposed to fall a George Osborne like 24%!

Bringing costs back in line with income is of course just good practice, and Barca's need for an emergency credit line in the summer told us all we need to know about how overstretched the club had become. After all, Laporta's regime oversaw the ludicrous saga of Zlatan Ibrahimovic's transfers which the club claim cost €33.4m including no less than €8m to his agent, the lucky Mino Raiola.


What has not been mentioned in all the gnashing of teeth in Catalonia is the threat to Barcelona from UEFA FFPR. Without the full 2009/10 accounts (which are yet to be posted on the club's website) we cannot fill in all the details, but the table below shows my estimate of how Barca would have done on the regulations' "break-even" test last season, as well as how the 2010/11 budget stacks up (footnotes at end of post):

On my calculations, FC Barcelona would have missed UEFA's "break-even" target by a staggering €48.5m if the rules had been in place last season. The "Acceptable Deviation" UEFA say they will permit each year is only €5m and of course Barcelona do not have a Sheikh Mansour to fill some of the gap.

The Rosell plan, shows the club squeaking in this year with a c. €10m surplus putting the club on a firmer footing for the first "monitoring period" for the new regulations, the 2011/12 season. Plans are of course plans and football is inherently unpredictable. Rosell and his board know all this of course which is why I think we can probably rule out the Catalans in any future bidding war for W Rooney esq.


Footnotes to FFPR table
* Only net finance costs provided by the club

** Non-football sporting revenue/costs assumed to be permitted for inclusion under Annex X B(1)(k) and C(1)(k)
*** 2008/09 youth teams costs assumed constant in 2009/10 and 2010/11
**** Estimated


The new UEFA regulations can be downloaded here.


LUHG

"United Against Glazer" march on 30th October

Too often football supporters in England believe they are powerless against the financial exploitation of our game and our clubs.

I do not believe this. In fact I believe that pressure is mounting on the Glazers and other carpetbaggers looking to personally profit at the expense of fans. I also believe that the Glazers have only delayed taking their £95m dividend "entitlement" because of their fears about how supporters would react....

Ticket sales are weak, the waiting list is gone, Gill et al fear more supporters making the tough decision to abandon their season tickets in the future. We know from sources inside the club that during the height of the green and gold campaign the hierachy were extremely worried about damage to the "brand" in the eyes of potential sponsors (note, not the club, the "brand").

Keeping this pressure up is important, so I would encourage all United supporters who can attend to join the:

"UNITED AGAINST GLAZER - MARCH TO OLD TRAFFORD"

On 30th October (before the Spurs match) from 3.30pm

Whether you have given up your ticket or still go to games, turn out and show the world what United supporters think of our owners. As the organisers say:

"There are only two sides to this fight"

Details are available at http://www.unitedagainstglazer.org.uk/

LUHG

United’s 2009/10 results: Understanding the cash flow

Apologies in advance for the slightly technical nature of this post. It is an analysis of the cash flow dynamics in United's business. It is not trying to make a political point, rather to help those without a financial background get their heads around what is happening and what the outlook is for the next few years. Please email me if you require any clarification on the more technical aspects and I'll endeavour to reply.


The club had a lot of debt (£522m) and a lot of cash in the bank (£164m) at the 30^th June. The source of the debt is obvious, the original takeover and the subsequent refinancings in 2006 and most recently in January 2010 when the "Senior Secured Notes" (aka "bonds") were issued. The cash in the bank has come from several sources which I describe below.

The reason all this is important (even if it is quite technical) is because not all the cash reported is "available", some of it will be needed to pay costs during the season when less cash flows in. In addition, the Glazers have large and growing "entitlements" to take dividends out of the club. They have not done so as yet, but supporters should be aware what impact taking up these rights would have on the bank balance. Finally, most agree the ageing squad will need investment in the coming years, probably more than the £31m spent in the 2009/10 season. By understanding the cash dynamics, people can reach their own conclusions about whether high investment and dividend payments are compatible.

Where has this £163m come from?

The "seasonal" effect and the need for a "buffer"

Football clubs receive a lot of money in the summer from season tickets and seasonal hospitality sales but "recognise" this income in the profit and loss account as games are played. In addition, a high proportion of TV money is paid at the end of the season. At the 30^th June, the amount received from season ticket and executive sales for the 2010/11 season was £52m (interestingly £2m lower than the previous year). Clubs' costs are incurred more evenly over the year (over 70% of costs are wages). This means that there is a substantial seasonal difference between when cash is received (mainly in the April to June quarter) and when profits are recognised (more evenly but with the October to December quarter with the most home games being the most important).


With the results just published, we can see for the first time how these seasonal effects impact on cash flow over each quarter of the financial year (the club has only had to report quarterly since the bond issue). The  seasonality can be seen in the pie charts below which compare how EBITDA is split and how operating cash flow (EBITDA + changes in working capital) is split. The difference is very, very pronounced, with over 70% of cash (remember this is before transfers, interest and spending on the stadium) coming in the final three months of the year, three months that only generate 19% of the year's operating profit.

So United has its highest cash balance at the end of the financial year in June. In fact the cash balance actually fell in each of the first three quarters of the year, reaching a low point of being down £55m on the year at the end of March (note the cash draw down excluding changes in borrowing was a still significant £38.5m at the end of Q3):

This seasonality explains why United have a history of holding substantial cash balances at the end of each season and has occasionally had to use its "Revolving Credit Facility" ("RCF"), a sort of overdraft facility. Since the bond issue in January, the club's current RCF is £75m which is available to cover short-term cash requirements. The bond prospectus gives some details about the RCF, including that it costs c. 3-4.5% above LIBOR (currently around 1%). More importantly, the RCF has a five day "clean down" to £25m each year. This means the club has to reduce the drawn balance of the facility to a maximum of £25m for at least five days a year. This is to ensure the facility is used for short term borrowing, not long term investment.


The table below shows the season end cash balance over the last few years (and also what percentage of turnover that represented at the time).

As the table shows, large cash balances are the norm for United (except when there is a one off hit to cash such as Lazio failing to pay for Stam in 2002 or the building work on the quadrants in 2006). From 2003 to 2009 (and excluding the quadrant impacted 2006), United had balances averaging £48m at its year end. So what changed in 2009 and 2010?

Cash Boost No.1 The Aon and other commercial upfront payments.

United negotiated a strange but useful pre-payment when it did the sponsorship deal with Aon in June 2009. Aon agreed to pay £35.9m (45%) of the £80m four year deal upfront and a year before the sponsorship started. This boosted the 2008/09 and 2009/10 cash balances, indeed it represents 24% of the 2008/09 closing balance and 22% of the 2009/10 balance. Such prepayments along with season ticket money received for the following season are called "deferred income" in the accounts. Deferred income from commercial contracts totalled £65.7m at 30^th June 2010, up £8.2m on the previous year. So United is sitting on £65.7m of cash from various sponsors and partners for sponsorship that has yet to happen. That represents 40% of the club's cash balance at 30^th June 2010.

This cash is great for the club of course, but as time goes on, will have the effect of reducing the club's cash flow compared to its profits. In each of the next four years, the club will book c. £20m of Aon related revenue (and profits as the costs of being sponsored are virtually zero) but will only receive £11m in cash (the other 45% having already been paid). On the Aon contract alone therefore, operating cash flow will be c. £9m a year lower than operating profit each year. Add in the other £29.8m of commercial deferred income and the hit to cash flow could be even greater (although we do not know any details of the other commercial prepayments).

Cash Boost No.2 Ronaldo and other transfers

The existence and potential use of "the Ronaldo money" has been a hot topic ever since he his sale to Real Madrid was announced on 11^th June 2009. The £80m received by United days before the end of the 2008/09 financial year represented 53% of that year's closing financial balance. Since that date, the club has spent £44m in cash on players (both new and ongoing payments for players already signed) and received £14m for selling players; a net spend of £31.8m. I think we can safely say therefore that "the Ronaldo money" is still there. It represents 49% of the club's current cash balance.

Cash Boost No.3 Virtually no interest paid between January and June 2010 but some swap costs

Interest on the old bank debt used to be paid quarterly. Interest on the bonds is paid twice a year on 1^st February and the 1^st August, with the first payment on 1^st August 2010. The cash flow statement for the period January to June 2010 therefore includes virtually no interest actually being paid (the interest is charged to the profit and loss account of course). The £15.2m of "interest" in the cash flow statement actually refers to a £12.7m payment on the swap closure and interest on the "Alderley Mortgage" taken out to buy the freight terminal next to Old Trafford. In future years around £45m (depending on exchange rates) will be paid out in cash each year and another c. £5m for swap costs. So in the 30th June 2010 cash balance is a one-off interest rate holiday of c. £10m (c. £22m bond interest which would "normally" be paid in the second half of the year minus the large swap cost).

The outlook for the club's cash position

Movements in cash flow can be divided into a series of categories, some of which are described above. Of primary importance of course are the cash profits (EBITDA) a business makes. I am going to deliberately leave the outlook for profits for another day, and focus on the other dynamics at work further down the cash flow statement. The following table shows the actual cash movements in some detail in 2008/09 and 2009/10 and my comments on the outlook (assuming flat EBITDA).

Thinking about dividends and the squad

United is a great business, and as the table above shows, if profits just remain flat, will still generate around £14m of cash next year (assuming a net £30m is spent on transfers). That £14m is before dividends, and in 2009/10 of course the Glazers did not take any of the £95m in dividends to which they were entitled.

Assuming flat profits, by the end of the financial year 2010/11 the dividend entitlement will have grown by another £28m. In total the entitlement will be £123m. Obviously if all this was paid, the net cash flow in the model above would be a £109m outflow not a £14m inflow. This would take the cash balance at the club down to around £55m, totally swallowing up the one-off benefits of the Aon prepayment and the Ronaldo money. The club's cash balance would be back to where it has been in previous years, the amount needed to cover seasonal fluctuations. If that wasn't enough, the ongoing dividend entitlement (roughly 50% of EBITDA minus interest) would make the club cash negative at current profitability.

Of course the vast majority of supporters don't spend a moment thinking about the year-end cash position of the club, but do spend time wondering what investment will be needed to keep our squad competitive in future years as Giggs, Scholes, Neville, Van de Sar, potentially Ferdinand and probably Hargreaves bow out.

I think the questions supporters need to ask are this:

    Will the Glazers take the £95m (soon to rise to c. £123m) in dividends they are "entitled to"?

and if they do....

    Will there be enough be in the kitty to adequately replace our ageing squad in the year or two ahead?

  LUHG

Manchester United results 2009/10: first thoughts

Results review

Revenue up 2.9% year on year, compares to 10.2% pa achieved 2000-2009. Lower growth down to "poor" season vs. 2008/09 impacting matchday and TV income. Media is boosted by the start of the new three year CL deal. Commercial growth remains strong.

Costs control at United has been very good. Like all clubs, wages continue to rise sharply (up 7% despite lower player bonuses) but other costs are down 15% leaving total costs flat. Much of this is due to fewer home games than last year and lower travel costs (not flying to a CL final sadly) and there is also an impact from lower expenses relating to various commercial contracts (these are not detailed or quantified and look to be a one-off).

With costs flat and revenue up 3%, EBITDA (pre-exceptionals) was up 9.5% to £100.8m. As ever United is a very well managed football club.

Below the EBITDA line we are back in horrible world of Glazernomics.

The £35.4m goodwill amortisation charge should be ignored, it's an non-cash accounting charge caused by the 2005 takeover and isn't a real cost.

The interest bill of £40.2m includes seven months of bank interest and five months of bond interest. It will be closer to £45m in the coming year.

The "amortisation of issue discount" of £6.7m reflects the fact that the bonds were issued at c. 2% discount to their face value (of £100 or $100) but must be repaid at that face value. The difference is accounted for every year to 2017, but the cost won't actually be incurred until they are repaid in 2017.

The big "nasty" in these number is of course the cost of terminating the swaps (which we learned about at the third quarter results). These swaps are derivative contracts taken out to hedge the interest paid on the old bank debt. The club fixed at a high rate in 2007 and by the end of 2009 when it came to unwind the contracts was sitting on a £40m loss. Although the whole amount is reflected in these accounts, only £14.6m has been paid in cash in 2009/10, the balance will be paid over the next six years. These derivatives were only required because of the debt placed on the club in 2005. This is £40m of costs incurred for no benefit to the football club at all.

The final interest related cost is the unrealised foreign exchange loss of £19.2m. This is another non-cash item reflecting the fact that at today's exchange rate, the cost of paying back the US dollar denominated bonds would be £19.2m higher than their original (sterling) value. As with the "amortisation of issue discount", this can be ignored. Who knows what the exchange rate will actually be in 2017.

Other key points

No money has been paid out of the club to redeem the PIKs. I have no rational financial explanation for this and nor does anyone else I have spoken to in the market. Without sounding like a poor man's Mystic Meg, I can only reiterate that I can see no other source to repay the PIKs other than United and that £70-95m will be used to do so at some point soon.

Net transfer spending (in cash so including ongoing payments for players acquired/sold in previous years) was £30.4m. Actual "additions" in note 11 of the accounts are shown as £25.7m, i.e. players with a value of £25.7m joined the club during the year regardless of the timings of payments. The club reveal that since the 30^th June year end, further players have been bought for £8.3m. I can only assume this is Bebe.

Initial conclusions

Thankfully United is not Liverpool off the pitch or on it. This is (operationally as a business) the best run football club in England, it has been for nigh on twenty years. Manchester United are at no risk of going bust.

The tragedy for the club is that so much of the profits are wasted in interest, fees and charges. To ensure the club can cover these, ticket prices are far above the level they would need to be if the club was debt free. Net investment in the playing squad is low and the coincidence with the need to service the debt is too great to ignore.

More to follow.....

LUHG

LFC: many unanswered questions

Edit at 12.45pm:

In his Sky Sports News interview, Broughton has just said that NESV would "do the right thing" on getting LFC a 60,000+ stadium but that they hadn't decided whether to build a new one or rebuild Anfield. I find this pretty extraordinary. Is this really a good deal for LFC without this issue agreed? Either NESV can't have a great deal of equity for investment or much confidence of raising debt finance for a new stadium. Time to put that scouse champagne (aka Diamond White) back in the fridge?

Where's the money for this coming from?

The fog hasn't cleared around the potential takeover of Liverpool Football Club by John W. Henry's New England Sports Ventures group, but already there are several key questions which Liverpool supporters should be asking:

1. Although the LFC statement talks of the NESV offer "removing the burden of acquisition debt", is the c. £300m offer purely equity financed?
   
   
2. If any new debt is being incurred in the purchase, what will this cost compared to the current c. £40m pa interest bill?
   
   
3. With the current c. £100m pa wage bill, can LFC comply with the new UEFA Financial Fair Play rules without Champions League football? If not, will one of Gerrard or Torres have to be sold?
   
   
4. The club requires around £400m to build its planned new stadium in Stanley Park, how will NESV finance this? Will further borrowing be incurred? Is any debt financing already arranged and on what terms?
   
   
5. Part of NESV's success with the Boston Red Sox has been driven by increasing revenue through aggressive ticket price increases at Fenway Park, will the new owners pursue a similar strategy at Anfield/the new stadium?
   
   
   
   

Hicks and Gillett have boasted of "doubling profits" at LFC, but in reality the club is a financial pygmy on the European stage. Looking at the last accounts, revenue was almost £100m less than United's but the club's wage bill was only £20m less. That was in a season when Liverpool came second in the league and earned £20m from the Champions League...

The one thing that is certain is that there is no easy fix for Liverpool's financial troubles.

LUHG

Arsenal’s 2009/10 results: overall business in excellent shape but industry headwinds persist

Arsenal Holdings plc today published preliminary results for the year to 31^st May 2010 (full accounts will be available in due course). This is my initial take on the figures.

Overview

The business is in very good shape overall. The strategy of borrowing to finance the building of the Emirates and the redevelopment of Highbury into apartments has clearly paid off. Net debt has fallen to £135.6m (2.4x football EBITDA) compared to a peak of £318.1m two years ago. All the debt incurred to redevelop Highbury has now been repaid and the Emirates financing is on a fixed rate of 5.3% with a maturity of around 20 years. The Highbury Square development generated operating profits of £15.2m, almost double last year's £7.8m. Now the property business is debt free, it should provide a useful fillip to cash flow in the next two years after which all sales will be complete.

Football profits (before player sales) are down because of rising costs and flat turnover. Higher profits on player sales compared to the previous year means profit before tax is up.

On these figures Arsenal will comfortably meet the new UEFA Financial Fair Play rules, in fact in this area it is probably the best placed of all the major English clubs.

Football revenue

All general admission and "Club Tier" season tickets sold out for the current season. The stadium brings in almost £3.5m of revenue per home game which is almost as much as Old Trafford (£3.6m per home game in 2008/09) despite the latter having a capacity 26% higher. This impressive sales performance is only part of the story of course. The further a team progresses through competitions the more income is generated and matchday income actually fell 6% in 2009/10 due to fewer home games being played (there was no CL semi-final for example).

Reflecting the improved Champions League TV deal that began in 2009/10 (and despite being knocked out a round earlier than the previous season), broadcasting income rose 15% to £85m. Arsenal significantly underperform United on media income due to a smaller share of the important CL "market pool" (Arsenal received €16.4m to United's €28.8m last year). The division of the pool is determined by the relative performance of clubs from each country and finishing places in the domestic league. Next year (in common with every other PL club), the new overseas rights deal means PL media income will rise by an estimated 10%.

Commercial and retail turnover declined year-on-year with both areas seeing falls of c. 9%. The club blamed this on their "...sensitivity to the recessionary climate". Arsenal are miles behind United, Real, Bayern and Barca when it comes to commercial revenue and recruited a new Chief Commercial Officer a year ago to improve in this area.

Overall, the increase in media income was not sufficient to offset weak commercial sales and the impact of fewer home games to leave football turnover down marginally.

Football costs

On the cost side, Arsenal have a good reputation for controlling wage costs with the move to the Emirates transforming the club's wages/turnover ratio, but these figures show the significant pressures still evident across football. Total wage costs (for all staff not just players) rose 6.5% and the club warns that there is more to come because "the full cost of a number of the new and revised player contracts entered into in the last 18 months has not yet fully translated into the reported wage cost". The ratio of wages to (football) turnover increased to 49.7% from 46.2%, still very good compared to a number around 80% at Chelsea and over 100% at City. In words that should concern all football clubs and supporters, Arsenal say:

"...there continues to be very strong upward pressure on players' wage expectations."

Football profits and margins

The wage pressure and slightly weaker turnover meant that EBITDA (before the impact of player sales) fell 13.5% year-on-year (a decrease of 375bps in the margin to 25.7%). The player amortisation charge rose by a moderate 4.8% to leave football EBIT down 34% at £20.4m.

Thankfully for the club, the sales of Adebayor and Kolo Toure to the ever generous Manchester City generated a profit of £38.1m vs. £23.2m in the prior year. This allowed EBIT including player sales to actually rise 8.5% to £58.5m. Football interest costs (the Emirate bonds) were down 1.7% to leave football PBT up 12.1% at £45m.

What we should take from this

Arsenal is a very well run club. Debt is totally under control, the business is profitable and cash generation is strong. Industry pressures (and underperformance on the pitch) means,  however, that there is little growth in the business.

These results also tell us quite a lot about the current economics of English football.

For those clubs with large modern stadiums, matchday still remains the most important element of turnover but growth in this area is hard to come by and revenue is of course highly dependent on the number of home games played.

The current growth cycle from media is clearly illustrated in these figures with Arsenal showing an increase year-on-year despite a weaker performance on the pitch as the new CL deal kicks in. But media growth is not a one way street and at 37% of media income the importance of CL qualification is obvious. I remain sceptical about ongoing football rights inflation. The domestic PL rights for the next three years have declined in real terms compared to the last deal perhaps showing early signs of maturity. International growth has been phenomenal, but may also be nearing a peak with some broadcasters now paying more per capita for PL rights than Sky/ESPN in the UK!

Commercial and retail revenue is obviously under pressure from the recession and with the prognosis for the UK economy dull at best, this trend seems likely to continue. Arsenal are determined to catch up with the best in class performance of United and the major Spanish clubs.

Whilst revenue for Arsenal and for most large English clubs looks to be stagnating, cost pressures remain very pronounced. Many hope that limits on squad sizes and the new UEFA Financial Fair Play regulations will moderate transfer and salary inflation, but there is no evidence of that from these figures.

Along with other big English clubs, Arsenal rely quite heavily on profits and cash from player sales (excluding the sale of Ronaldo the top seven English clubs reported an average profit on player sales of £19m in the 2008/09 season). The sharp decline in transfer activity over the summer means this year this source of profits cannot be relied upon. Arsenal say:

"There has been very limited player sale activity during the summer transfer window. As a result, in contrast to each of the previous three years, we do not have a significant profit on disposal of player registrations on the books at this stage of the new financial year. Subject to any transfer activity in the January 2011 window this may impact the final level of profits to be reported for the financial year 2010/11."

The flipside to lower receipts from sales may in the longer run be lower amortisation charges for clubs, but in the shorter term the impact may well be negative.

These results show what a prudently financed, well managed football club should look like. The sharp decline in net debt (debt taken on only for the purposes of investment, not to finance an LBO) stands in stark contrast to position of Manchester United and Liverpool.

Finance does not of course win trophies, and it has been five years since Arsenal has won one (and that was totally undeserved), but in a difficult world Arsenal look financially well placed.

LUHG

The Glazers and the “Rich List”: why Forbes can’t add up

The Glazer family are rich, asset rich. They own what is generally considered to be the world’s most valuable football club and an NFL franchise. But what is their net worth?

That titan of business journalism Forbes has just published its semi-annual list of “400 Richest Americans”. Malcolm Glazer (and family) come in at no. 136 with an estimated net worth of $2.6bn. They comment:

“Owns NFL's Tampa Bay Buccaneers (team valued at $1 billion); controls English soccer's Manchester United, worth $1.84 billion (the sport's most valuable team burdened by a near 50% debt load). Inherited watch business from father at 15; formed real estate company First Allied. Today owns more than 6.7 million square feet of retail space. Opening of Glazer Children's Museum in Tampa slated for September. Sons now manage family assets.”

Given that the two key assets in this calculation are sports teams, it’s handy that Forbes also provide its own valuations for those, the most recent being their 25^th August 2010 valuation of the Tampa Bay Buccaneers and their 21^st April 2010 valuation of Manchester United.

Forbes’ sports valuations are always calculated as “enterprise value”, that is the combined value of debt and equity (unless the debt relates directly to stadium construction which is not relevant in these cases). Forbes also helpfully show what proportion of this “team value” estimate relates is debt.

The debt figure for United in their April valuation ($844m or c. £540m) clearly doesn’t include the PIKs which is a pretty major oversight. We know that the PIKS were around £228m at 30^th June, so even if only 80% are owed to 3^rd parties, that’s another c. $283m of debt they’ve missed (£228m x 0.8 x $1.55 exchange rate). That would takes the net equity value of the two sports clubs to $1.6bn:

So where do Forbes get the other c. $1bn in their estimate of the Glazer fortune from?

Forbes mention First Allied Corporation, but they clearly haven't looked at it in any detail as they seem to believe that the company “owns more than 6.7 million square feet of retail space”.  This is indeed the number of the main page of the First Allied website, but when one looks at county or mortgage records for the sixty-four centres First Allied say they own, the actual square footage is only 4.7m....

This 4.7m square foot of space is generating around $6m per annum in cash flow at present (that isn’t an estimate, it’s from the CMBS filings each centre makes), that’s before any central business costs. Is that worth $1bn? The answer is clearly no. Only half the centres generate any positive cash flow at all. Putting them on a capitalisation rate of 8.5% yields a value of around $70m. Which still leaves a $889m hole in Forbes’ big number.

Maybe the Glazers have over $800m just sitting around? If that were true, why not repay all the PIKs? Or invest in the Bucs playing squad? It sounds unlikely.

So Forbes end up looking pretty dumb for not being able to add up their own numbers or include $283m of PIK debt in their calculations and the Glazers look asset rich but suspiciously cash poor.

LUHG